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STUDENT IS A NICE NAME FOR FREE LABOR
Jenna M. Anderson*
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) contends that
the principle of amateurism protects student-athletes and ensures that
their number one priority is education. Although this may have been
true when the NCAA was formed, the commercialization of college
sports and accompanying monetary incentives have enticed the NCAA
to enforce rules that exploit student-athletes at the detriment of their
education.
The NCAA’s impure motives are no longer going unnoticed. The
public is disgusted by what it sees in the media. Student-athletes are
rebelling by suing the NCAA for violating federal antitrust laws. The
states are passing laws that give the NCAA no choice but to make a
change. Courts are chipping away at the principle of amateurism one
case at a time.
The NCAA must be held accountable. This note proposes a threepart, student-centered solution to reform the current state of affairs.
First, the United States Supreme Court should definitively hold that the
principle of amateurism is not a legitimate procompetitive purpose for
the NCAA to pursue. Second, the NCAA should abolish the principle of
amateurism and create a line of demarcation between college and
professional athletics by redefining the term “student-athlete” to place
an appropriate emphasis on education. Third, the universities should
improve the current curriculum options offered to student-athletes.

* Editor-in-Chief, SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW, Volume 61. J.D., Santa Clara
University School of Law, 2021. M.B.A., Santa Clara University Leavey School of Business,
2021. I would like to thank my friends and colleagues of the SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW for
unwavering dedication, Professor Donald Polden for his thoughtful recommendations, the
faculty at Santa Clara Law for unconditional support, and my family for listening to me
incessantly talk about the Law Review.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) claims that
the number one priority of a Division I student-athlete is education,
while the competitive sport is an extracurricular activity.1 The NCAA
contends that its rules protect student-athletes from dangerous athletic
practices and exploitation.2 Although these claims may have been true
when the NCAA was formed, the commercialization of college sports
and accompanying monetary incentives have enticed the NCAA to
enforce rules that exploit student-athletes at the detriment of their
education.3
Student-athletes provide free labor to the NCAA and member
universities, while the NCAA rakes in millions of dollars in revenue.4
The NCAA has strict rules prohibiting student-athletes from seeking
representation, receiving compensation, entering a professional draft,
benefiting from their own name, image, or likeness, etc.5 Studentathletes who disagree with the anticompetitive effects of these rules have
filed numerous lawsuits against the NCAA.6 The NCAA has continued
to fight back by arguing that the principle of amateurism justifies the
anticompetitive rules.7
The NCAA has successfully exploited student-athletes under the
guise of amateurism for years, but as of late, “[t]hreats [against the
NCAA] loom on multiple fronts: in Congress, the courts, breakaway
athletic conferences, student rebellion, and public disgust.”8 In response
to these threats, the NCAA will likely modernize the name, image, and
likeness rules.9 However, the NCAA has made it clear that it will not
abandon the principle of amateurism.10

1. See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2020-2021 DIVISION I MANUAL §§ 2.9,
2.15 (2020) [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL].
2. See id.
3. See Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2011),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-collegesports/308643/.
4. See id.
5. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 12.1.2.
6. See Branch, supra note 3.
7. See id.
8. Id.
9. See Michelle Brutlag Hosick, DI Council grants waiver to allow transfer studentathletes to compete immediately, NCAA (Dec. 16, 2020, 6:31 PM),
https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/di-council-grants-waiver-allowtransfer-student-athletes-compete-immediately.
10. See Donald M. Remy, NCAA statement regarding Supreme Court petition for Alston
case, NCAA (Oct. 15, 2020, 10:32 AM), https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/mediacenter/news/ncaa-statement-regarding-supreme-court-petition-alston-case.
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Part II of this Note provides the necessary background information,
including discussing the evolution of the NCAA and its path to becoming
the economic powerhouse it is today.11 The section then discusses the
NCAA’s expansion of the term “student-athlete,” and how it avoided
classifying student-athletes as employees.12 Next, the section explains
the rule, rationale, and reality behind the principle of amateurism.13 The
section then discusses the Sherman Antitrust Act and how it is relevant
to NCAA litigation and provides a deeper analysis of amateurism.14
Finally, the section outlines the major points of the name, image, and
likeness debate15 and Fair Pay to Play legislation.16
Part III of this Note identifies the legal problem associated with the
vague and inconsistent principle of amateurism.17 Part IV conducts an
analysis of the legal problem and explains why the principle of
amateurism should not be upheld.18 The analysis section explains why
the principle of amateurism is no longer consistent with reality.19 The
section then refutes the NCAA’s procompetitive justifications for
amateurism by detailing why amateurism does not keep college sports
pure,20 why amateurism is not essential for college sports to remain
popular,21 and why amateurism is more detrimental to education than
helpful.22 Next, the section analyzes the difficulties associated with
making student-athletes employees.23 The section then explains why
allowing student-athletes to accept compensation from third-parties for
the use of name, image, and likeness is a step in the right direction.24
Lastly, the analysis section illustrates the concept of allowing
professional athletes to compete at the intercollegiate level.25
The final portion of this Note, Part V, proposes a three-part,
student-centered solution to reform the current state of affairs.26 First,
this section urges the United States Supreme Court to definitively hold
that the principle of amateurism is not a legitimate procompetitive
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part II.C.2.
See infra Part II.C.3.
See infra Part II.D.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.A.1.
See infra Part IV.A.2.
See infra Part IV.A.3.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.C.
See infra Part IV.D.
See infra Part V.
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purpose for the NCAA to pursue.27 Second, this section encourages the
NCAA to abolish the principle of amateurism and create a line of
demarcation between college and professional athletics by redefining the
term “student-athlete” to place an appropriate emphasis on education.28
Third, this section proposes improvements to the current curriculum
options offered to student-athletes.29
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Evolution of the NCAA
The NCAA is an association that functions as a governing body for
varsity-level competition in intercollegiate sports for men and women.30
The association was founded in 1906 to protect student-athletes from
dangerous athletic practices and exploitation.31
In the late 1800s and early 1900s, the brutality of college football
caused numerous fatalities.32 “A reported 18 boys were killed and 149
seriously hurt during the 1905 football season.”33 Public outrage and
talk of ending the sport for good prompted the creation of the
NCAA. 34 While the NCAA tried to enforce rules, it remained
powerless for many years.35
It was not until 1951, when the NCAA hired Walter Byers to act
as the first full-time executive director, that the NCAA was able to
assert any force.36 Byers created a small infractions board to set
penalties against schools who did not comply with NCAA rules.37
To put the NCAA back on the map, he used a scandal involving the
University of Kentucky,38 a reigning national basketball champion.39
27. See infra Part V.A.
28. See infra Part V.B.
29. See infra Part V.C.
30. National Collegiate Athletic Association, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/National-Collegiate-Athletic-Association (last visited Jan.
25, 2021); see also What is the NCAA?, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/mediacenter/ncaa-101/what-ncaa (last visited Dec. 18, 2020) (noting that NCAA members include
1,098 colleges and universities and 102 athletic conferences).
31. ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 30; see WALTER BYERS & CHARLES
HAMMER, UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT: EXPLOITING COLLEGE ATHLETES 7, 38-39 (1995).
32. See id.
33. Id.
34. See Branch, supra note 3.
35. Id. (explaining how the NCAA could not even successfully mandate helmets
until 1939).
36. See BYERS & HAMMER, supra note 31, at 17, 56; see also Branch, supra note 3.
37. See Branch, supra note 3.
38. See BYERS & HAMMER, supra note 31, at 17 (noting a scandal involving illegal
payments and point manipulation).
39. See Branch, supra note 3.
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By lobbying and gaining the support of a Dean at the University of
Kentucky, Byers successfully suspended the Kentucky basketball
team for the entire 1952-53 season.40 As a result, schools began to
take the NCAA more seriously and comply with its rules.41
In the same year, the NCAA voted to outlaw televised games,
but to retain the right to license a specific few through the
association, including licensing certain football games to NBC for
$1.14 million.42 The NBC contract marked the start of rapid growth
in revenue and power for the NCAA.43 Byers went on to negotiate
nearly fifty sports television contracts, securing a several multimillion dollar deals for the NCAA.44
By 1973, the NCAA was large enough to reorganize and create
three levels of competition: Division I (most competitive), Division II,
and Division III (least competitive).45 Despite the three levels of
competition, most of the NCAA’s time and resources are spent on
Division I athletics.46
The NCAA of today generates the majority of its revenue from
“[t]elevision and marketing rights fees, primarily from the Division I
men’s basketball championship. Championship ticket sales provide
most of the remaining dollars.”47 The NCAA generates $867.5 million
in revenue from the Division I Men’s Basketball Championship and
$177.9 million in revenue from ticket sales for championships.48 The
NCAA distributes these funds in the following ways: $222 million is
“[d]istributed to Division I schools to help fund NCAA sports and
provide scholarships for college athletes[;]” $168.8 million is
“[d]istributed to Division I conferences and independent schools[,]
based on their performance in the men’s basketball tournament over a
six-year rolling period[,]” “to fund NCAA sports and provide
scholarships for college athletes[;]” $153.8 million “[p]rovides college
athletes the opportunity to compete for a championship and includes
support for team travel, food, and lodging[;]” $86.6 million is
“[d]istributed to Division I student-athletes for essential needs that arise
40. Id.; see also BYERS & HAMMER, supra note 31, at 17.
41. See Branch, supra note 3.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See BYERS & HAMMER, supra note 31, at 9.
45. See ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 30.
46. See Where Does the Money Go?, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/about/where-doesmoney-go (last visited Dec. 22, 2020).
47. See Finances, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/finances (last visited
Dec. 22, 2020).
48. See Where Does the Money Go?, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/about/where-doesmoney-go (last visited Dec. 22, 2020).
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during their time in college[;]” $64.5 million funds “catastrophic injury
insurance, drug testing, student-athlete leadership programs, post
graduate scholarships and additional Association-wide championships
support[;]” $53.6 million is “[d]istributed equally among Division I
basketball-playing conferences[,] that meet athletic and academic
standards to play in the men’s basketball tournament,” “to fund NCAA
sports and provide scholarships for college athletes[;]” $49.2 million is
“[d]istributed to Division I schools to assist with academic programs and
services[;]” $53.3 million “[f]unds championships, grants and other
initiatives for Division II college athletes[;]” $23.3 million “[c]overs
costs related to NCAA governance committees and the annual NCAA
Convention[;]” $35.2 million “[f]unds championships, grants and other
initiatives for Division III college athletes[;]” $10 million is
“[d]istributed to Division I conferences for programs that enhance
officiating, compliance, minority opportunities and more[;]” $3.8
million “[s]upports various educational services for members to help
prepare student-athletes for life, including the Emerging Leaders
Seminars and the Pathway Program[;]” $58.4 million “[i]ncludes
support for Association-wide legal services, communications and
business insurance[;]” and $ 44.8 million “[f]unds the day-to-day
operations of the NCAA national office, including administrative and
financial services, information technology and facilities management.”49
In addition to growth of the NCAA’s revenue, its body of rules has
increased in complexity.50 According to Byers, the NCAA evolved from
“simple rules and personally responsible officials to convoluted,
cyclopedic regulations;”51 now, student-athletes are expected to comply
with a 450-page manual.52
B. The NCAA’s Carefully Crafted “Student-Athlete”
Walter Byers is known as “the man who built the NCAA, then tried
to tear it down.”53 In his book, Unsportsmanlike Conduct: Exploiting
College Athletes, Byers apologized for the mess he created.54 He
admitted that the NCAA purposely “crafted the term student-athlete” to

49. Id. (“The distributions listed are recurring, and the information does not include any
one-time distributions.”).
50. See BYERS & HAMMER, supra note 31, at 17.
51. Id.
52. See generally NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1.
53. Karen Given, Walter Byers: The Man Who Built The NCAA, Then Tried to Tear it
Down, WBUR (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.wbur.org/onlyagame/2017/10/13/walter-byersncaa.
54. Id.; see generally BYERS & HAMMER, supra note 31.
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be ambiguous to avoid paying students workers’ compensation.55
Despite its ambiguity, the term student-athlete was cited by the courts in
favor of the NCAA during workers’ compensation cases.56 For example,
in the 1950s, Ray Dennison’s widow filed for workers’ compensation
death benefits after her husband died from a head injury received while
playing football for his college team.57 The NCAA avoided liability in
this case because Dennison was classified as a “student-athlete” and the
university was not “in the football business.”58 After this case,
“[s]tudent-athlete became the NCAA’s signature term, repeated
constantly in and out of courtrooms.”59
A similar lawsuit was filed in the 1990s by Kent Waldrep, a
running back at Texas Christian University (TCU), who became
paralyzed after being tackled in a game.60 TCU stopped paying his
medical bills after nine months, leaving his family to rely on charity
money.61
The appeals court rejected Waldrep’s workers’
compensation claim because he could not be classified as an
employee.62 Their justification relied on the fact that he had not paid
taxes on the financial aid he received. 63 The NCAA successfully
crafted and implemented the term “student-athlete” and they
justified it with the “principle of amateurism.”64
C. The Principle of Amateurism
At the core of the NCAA is the “principle of amateurism,” the idea
that a professional athlete is prohibited from competing at the
intercollegiate level.65 The NCAA defines a professional athlete as “one
who receives any kind of payment, directly or indirectly, for athletics
participation except as permitted by the governing legislation of the
Association.”66 The definition of compensation has evolved over time
to allow students to be awarded “full cost of tuition” scholarships while

55. BYERS & HAMMER, supra note 31, at 69 (explaining that university’s workers’
compensation plans provide no coverage for disabling injuries student-athletes may suffer).
56. See Branch, supra note 3; see also BYERS & HAMMER, supra note 31, at 70.
57. See Branch, supra note 3; see also BYERS & HAMMER, supra note 31, at 70.
58. See Branch, supra note 3.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See Branch, supra note 3.
64. See BYERS & HAMMER, supra note 31, at 68-69.
65. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, §§ 12.01.1, 12.01.2.
66. Id. § 12.02.11.
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still being considered an amateur.67
Under the “principle of
amateurism,” the NCAA Constitution states that:
Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and
their participation should be motivated primarily by education and
by the physical, mental and social benefits to be derived. Student
participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and studentathletes should be protected from exploitation by professional and
commercial enterprises.68

The amateur status can be lost when the individual gets paid or accepts
a promise of pay based on athletic skill, makes any commitment to play
professional athletics, enters into a professional draft, or enters into an
agreement with an agent.69 If an individual loses the “amateur status,”
he or she becomes ineligible to compete in that particular intercollegiate
sport.70
The NCAA is so adamant that student-athletes remain amateurs that
the word “amateur” appears 191 times in the 2020-21 Manual.71 The
NCAA has articulated several justifications for upholding amateurism:
(1) amateurism keeps college sports “pure;”72 (2) amateurism is essential
for college sports to remain successful and popular;73 and (3) amateurism
allows student-athletes to receive an education.74

67. Marc Tracy, Top Conferences to Allow Aid for Athletes’ Full Bills, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
17, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/18/sports/ncaas-top-conferences-to-allow-aidfor-athletes-full-bills.html (reporting that in January 2015, the NCAA agreed to permit
increased scholarships up to the full cost of attendance).
68. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, §2.9.
69. See id. § 12.1.2 (“An individual loses amateur status and thus shall not be eligible for
intercollegiate competition in a particular sport if the individual: (a) Uses his or her athletics
skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in any form in that sport; (b) Accepts a promise of pay
even if such pay is to be received following completion of intercollegiate athletics
participation; (c) Signs a contract or commitment of any kind to play professional athletics,
regardless of its legal enforceability or any consideration received, except as permitted in
Bylaw 12.2.5.1; (d) Receives, directly or indirectly, a salary, reimbursement of expenses or
any other form of financial assistance from a professional sports organization based on
athletics skill or participation, except as permitted by NCAA rules and regulations; (e)
Competes on any professional athletics team per Bylaw 12.02.12, even if no pay or
remuneration for expenses was received, except as permitted in Bylaw 12.2.3.2.1; (f) After
initial full-time collegiate enrollment, enters into a professional draft (see Bylaw 12.2.4); or
(g) Enters into an agreement with an agent.”).
70. Id.
71. See generally NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1.
72. See Branch, supra note 3.
73. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101-02 (1984); see also
Thomas Baker, Why The Latest NCAA Lawsuit Is Unlikely To Change Its Amateurism Rules—
But
Should,
FORBES
(Sept.
11,
2018,
12:40
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbaker/2018/09/11/the-economics-of-amateurismbreaking-down-the-latest-lawsuit-against-the-ncaa/?sh=b13acd824788.
74. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 124 (White, J., dissenting).
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1. Amateurism in Practice
While justifications for amateurism sound reasonable, in practice
they have led to absurd results. For example, A.J. Green, a Division I
wide receiver, was penalized with a four-game suspension because he
sold an old jersey to raise money for a spring-break trip.75 According to
the NCAA, the profit generated by the sale violated Green’s amateur
status.76 “While he served the suspension, the Georgia Bulldogs store
continued legally selling replicas of Green’s No. eight jersey for
$39.95 and up.”77 Similarly, the NCAA imposed a five-game
suspension on Terrelle Pryor, Ohio State quarterback, for getting a
tattoo that was discounted as a result of his football popularity.78
Critics of the NCAA’s strict policy argue that the fact that the sale
of a jersey received a four-game suspension and getting a discount
deserved a five-game suspension is evidence of the arbitrary nature
of these penalties.79
James Paxton, a pitcher for the University of Kentucky, rejected
a $1 million contract from the Toronto Blue Jays because he wanted
to pitch for his team in the College World Series.80 However,
because Paxton used an agent to negotiate with the Blue Jays, he was
in violation of the NCAA bylaws.81 Paxton was suspended from the
team because the University did not want to be reprimanded by the
NCAA and jeopardize its chance to compete.82 Paxton lost the
opportunity to play for both the Blue Jays and his University. 83
2. The Sherman Antitrust Act and NCAA Litigation
Section 1 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act (hereinafter “Sherman
Act”) prohibits unreasonable restraints on trade.84 In order to establish
a Section 1 violation, a plaintiff must show: “(1) that there was a
contract, combination, or conspiracy; (2) that the agreement
unreasonably restrained trade under either a per se rule of illegality or a
75. Branch, supra note 3.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See id.
80. Id.
81. Branch, supra note 3.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C § 1 (2004) (“Every contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”); see Bus. Elecs. Corp. v.
Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988) (recognizing the Sherman Act as only
prohibiting unreasonable restraints of trade).
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rule of reason analysis; and (3) that the restraint affected interstate
commerce.”85 The NCAA has been forced to defend its compensation
and eligibility rules against antitrust challenges on numerous
occasions.86 Presently, only one Sherman Act violation claim filed
against the NCAA has been heard by the Supreme Court of the United
States, NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma.87
In 1981, the NCAA’s television plan limited the number of games
a university could televise as well as the amount available to the public.88
Frustrated by the NCAA’s tight hold on this major revenue stream,
several universities decided to disregard the contract plan and negotiate
with a television network on their own.89 The NCAA threatened to
impose sanctions on the universities as punishment for entering into an
independent contract.90 Two universities, the University of Oklahoma
and the University of Georgia, filed suit, alleging that the NCAA’s
control over the television rights was anticompetitive and an
unreasonable restraint on trade.91
The district court sided with the universities and “defined the
relevant market as ‘live college football television.’ ” 92 The district
court compared the NCAA’s control to a “classic cartel.”93 The court of
appeals affirmed, finding that the NCAA’s plan constituted illegal per se
price fixing.94 The court of appeals rejected all three of the NCAA’s
arguments: the television plan promoted live attendance, athletically
85. Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Hairston v.
Pac. 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1318 (9th Cir. 1996)).
86. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 29, In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic
Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. granted, 2020 WL
6150345 (U.S. Oct. 15, 2020) (No. 20-512).
87. Jessica Gresko, High court agrees to hear NCAA athlete compensation case, AP
NEWS (Dec. 16, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/athlete-compensation-basketball-elenakagan-football-us-supreme-court-4fa2fc30e1a3f21329f4ec22cc55bb28. However, this will
no longer be the case after the Supreme Court hears Alston in the Spring of 2021. Petition for
a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 86; see also NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla.,
468 U.S. 85, 85 (1984).
88. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 91-94.
89. Id. at 94-95.
90. Id. at 95.
91. Id. at 88.
92. Id. at 95.
93. Id. at 96 (making this comparison because the NCAA had “almost absolute control
over the supply of college football which is made available to the networks, to television
advertisers, and ultimately to the viewing public.”). Author Taylor Branch, also referred to
the NCAA’s control as a “classic cartel.” See Branch, supra note 3. Branch explains that it
was the influence of Walter Byers that made the NCAA the classic cartel it is today. Id.
(“Byers, having negotiated the NCAA’s television package up to $3.1 million per football
season—which was higher than the NFL’s figure in those early years—had made the NCAA
into a spectacularly profitable cartel.”).
94. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 97.
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balanced competition, and effective competition with other television
programming.95
The Supreme Court heard the case and made note that the issues in
the case,96 horizontal price fixing and output limitation, are usually
viewed by the Court under a per se rule of illegality,97 where an inquiry
into a particular market is not necessary.98 However, the Court found
that it would be “inappropriate to apply a per se rule in this case [as] it
involves an industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are
essential if the product is to be available at all.”99 Accordingly, the
Supreme Court used the rule of reason standard to evaluate whether or
not the restraint was unreasonable.100 Under this standard, the Court is
required to consider the impact of the competitive conditions.101 The
rule of reason analysis consists of three steps.102 In step one, the
plaintiffs produce evidence of “significant anticompetitive effects within
a relevant market.”103 If the plaintiffs meet the burden set forth in step
one, step two requires the defendants to provide “evidence of the
restraint’s procompetitive effects.”104 In step three, the plaintiffs must
show that substantially less restrictive alternatives exist to achieve
legitimate objectives.105
In Board of Regents, the NCAA was unable to convince the
Supreme Court that maintaining a competitive balance was a
procompetitive justification because in this situation, consumption
would increase if controls were removed.106 The NCAA was also unable
to convince the Court that the broadcasting restraint was essential for the

95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979)
(explaining that the per se rule is applied when “the practice facially appears to be one that
would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output.”).
98. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 100 (noting that when a per se rule is appropriate, restraint
is presumed to be unreasonable without considering market context).
99. Id. at 86. (“The NCAA and its members market competition itself—contests between
competing institutions,” thus a rule of reason standard should be applied).
100. Id.; see also O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1070 (9th Cir. 2015) (stating the
rule of reason three-step framework: (1) plaintiff must produce evidence of “significant
anticompetitive effects within a relevant market” (2) if plaintiff meets burden, defendant
provides evidence of “restraint’s procompetitive effects” (3) plaintiff must show substantially
less restrictive alternatives exist to achieve legitimate objectives).
101. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 103 (explaining that reasonableness can be determined
on nature or character of contract or on surrounding circumstances).
102. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1070.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 119-20.
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preservation of amateurism by spreading revenues among the schools.107
In dicta, the Supreme Court recognized the value of amateurism, but did
not find this role consistent with rules that restrict output.108 Ultimately,
the Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the lower courts, holding
that the NCAA “restricted rather than enhanced the place of
intercollegiate athletics in the Nation’s life.”109
Student-athletes saw this holding as an opportunity to use the
Sherman Act to put an end to amateurism. However, lower courts have
continued to uphold the principle of amateurism by citing one line of
dicta from Board of Regents, “[i]n order to preserve the character and
quality of the ‘product,’ athletes must not be paid, must be required to
attend class, and the like.”110 In a string of federal appeals in 1988, 1992,
and 2012, the NCAA successfully defended amateurism from the
Sherman Act.
In 1988, a class action lawsuit was filed against the NCAA,
McCormack v. NCAA,111 alleging the NCAA violated antitrust and civil
rights laws by restricting benefits awarded to student-athletes.112 The
NCAA distinguished this case from Board of Regents by arguing that,
unlike the television restrictions, the eligibility rules have primarily
noncommercial objectives, as they are intended to promote
amateurism.113 The Fifth Circuit applied the rule of reason and
determined that the NCAA’s eligibility requirements rationally furthered
the goal of amateurism and did not pose an unreasonable restraint on
trade.114
In 1992, a Notre Dame football player sued the NCAA in Banks v.
NCAA,115 on the grounds that the no draft and no agent rules constituted
an illegal restraint on trade in violation of the Sherman Act.116 Banks
suffered from recurring football related injuries throughout his college
107. Id. at 87.
108. Id. at 120 (“The NCAA plays a critical role in the maintenance of a revered tradition
of amateurism in college sports. There can be no question but that it needs ample latitude to
play that role, or that the preservation of the student-athlete in higher education adds richness
and diversity to intercollegiate athletics.”).
109. Id. This decision “freed the football schools to sell any and all games the markets
would bear. Coaches and administrators no longer had to share the revenue generated by their
athletes with smaller schools outside the football consortium.” Branch, supra note 3. Even
though this was a major loss of revenue for the NCAA, “a rising tide of money from basketball
concealed the structural damage of the Regents decision.” Id.
110. Id. at 102.
111. McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988).
112. Id. at 1340.
113. Id. at 1343.
114. Id. at 1343-45.
115. Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992).
116. Id. at 1084.
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career.117 In an effort to fully recover, he decided to sit out for the
football season of his fourth year.118 During that time, he entered the
National Football League (NFL) draft and contracted an agent to
represent him.119 He was not drafted but was informed “that he would
have been invited to the regular NFL scouting try-outs if he had
completed his collegiate eligibility.”120 He then decided to exercise his
final year of eligibility,121 but was barred by the NCAA for breaching
the no draft122 and no agent123 bylaws.124 The Seventh Circuit applied
the rule of reason standard and ruled in favor of the NCAA, holding that
Banks failed “to allege an anti-competitive impact on a discernible
market.”125
Circuit Judge Flaum dissented, acknowledging that the nationwide
labor market for college football players does exist.126 He explained that
NCAA member colleges do in fact purchase the labor of players; “[t]he
players agree to compete in football games sponsored by the colleges,
games that typically garner the colleges a profit, in exchange for tuition,
room, board and other benefits.”127 He further reasoned that the no draft
rule is anticompetitive because a university offering students the ability
to return to intercollegiate athletics if the draft proves unsuccessful
would be more attractive to an elite student-athlete than a university
declining to offer that opportunity.128 Judge Flaum recognized that the
principles of amateurism are not consistent with reality; while college
football generates nonpecuniary benefits, it is also highly
commercialized and profitable.129

117. Id. at 1083.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1083 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that NCAA rules only
allow an athlete to play four seasons of an intercollegiate sport within five years of entering
college).
122. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 12.2.4.2 (“After initial full-time collegiate
enrollment, an individual loses amateur status in a particular sport when the individual asks
to be placed on the draft list . . . of a professional league in that sport.”).
123. Id. § 12.3.1 (“An individual shall be ineligible for participation in an intercollegiate
sport if he or she ever has agreed (orally or in writing) to be represented by an agent for the
purpose of marketing his or her athletics ability or reputation in that sport.”).
124. Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1992).
125. Id. at 1094.
126. Id. at 1095 (Flaum, J., dissenting).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1099 (7th Cir. 1992).
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In 2012, Agnew v. NCAA130 involved the NCAA’s scholarship
restrictions.131 Two former college football players, Agnew and
Courtney, had been highly recruited high school football players who
received offers from a number of college football teams.132 Agnew, in
2006, and Courtney, in 2009, accepted one-year full athletic scholarships
to play football for their respective universities.133 At the time, the
NCAA bylaws prohibited member universities from offering studentathletes multi-year scholarships.134 Both Agnew and Courtney suffered
injuries that resulted in the loss of their scholarships.135 They filed a
lawsuit against the NCAA, alleging that the NCAA’s one-year
maximum scholarship requirement as well as the cap on scholarships
available violated the Sherman Act.136 The plaintiffs argued that the
relevant trade market being restrained was “the labor market for studentathletes and the product market for bachelor’s degrees.”137
The dissenting judge in Banks,138 Seventh Circuit Judge Flaum,
presided over Agnew as well, but this time he wrote for the majority
siding with the NCAA.139 The district court did not consider whether
the NCAA bylaws were unreasonably restricting trade because they
dismissed the case on grounds that the plaintiffs could not “allege a
relevant cognizable market under the Sherman Act.”140 Judge Flaum and
the Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court that these plaintiffs did
not allege a relevant cognizable market; however, they did not agree that
the plaintiffs could not allege such a market.141 The Court recognized
that “[i]t is undeniable that a market of some sort is at play in this
case,”142 but the Sherman Act only applies to commercial transactions.143

130. Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012).
131. Id. at 332.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 333 (noting that plaintiffs challenged two NCAA Bylaws from the 2009-10
NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL––the one-year scholarship limit in bylaw 15.3.3.1 and the cap on
the amount of athletic scholarships colleges are allowed to offer in bylaw 15.5.4).
135. Id. at 332 (stating that Courtney’s financial circumstances and loss of scholarship
forced him to transfer schools and pay tuition out-of-pocket).
136. Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 333 (7th Cir. 2012).
137. Id. at 334 (stating plaintiffs’ argument that if allowed, schools would offer multi-year
scholarships to remain competitive in the market for premier student-athletes).
138. Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1094 (7th Cir. 1992).
139. Agnew, 683 F.3d at 332.
140. Id. at 345 (7th Cir. 2012).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 338.
143. See id. at 340 (“Despite the nonprofit status of NCAA member schools, the
transactions those schools make with premier athletes—full scholarships in exchange for
athletic services—are not noncommercial, since schools can make millions of dollars as a
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This opinion invited future plaintiffs to be creative and identify the
proper market.
In a string of cases in 2006, 2009, and 2013, the NCAA took a step
back in terms of protecting the principle of amateurism. In 2006, a class
action lawsuit, White v. NCAA,144 was filed against the NCAA by
Division I football and basketball student-athletes.145 The plaintiffs
alleged that the NCAA’s grant-in-aid (GIA) cap requirement,
prohibiting member institutions from covering expenses other than
tuition, room and board, and books,146 violated the Sherman Act because
if given the opportunity, member institutions would compete to offer
better financial aid packages to desirable prospective athletes.147 The
NCAA settled the case for $10 million and dedicated $218 million to
student-athletes in financial or academic need.148 Although the
settlement did not require the NCAA to admit any fault or wrong
doing,149 it was a foothold for future litigation.
In 2009, Oliver v. NCAA150 involved a challenge to the NCAA’s
bylaws prohibiting student-athletes from hiring attorneys or agents to be
present at negotiations with professional organizations.151 Oliver, a
baseball player for Oklahoma State University, was suspended
indefinitely after the NCAA found out he had hired a sports agent and
entered the Major League Baseball (MLB) draft prior to entering
college.152 The Minnesota Twins offered him a contract while his agent
was present, but he ultimately decided he would rather go to college.153
In response to the suspension, Oliver sought a declaratory judgment and
injunctive relief enjoining the NCAA bylaws prohibiting representation
by a lawyer or agent as unenforceable.154
The district court found the rule contravened the NCAA’s goal of
protecting student-athletes because it “allows for exploitation of the
result of these transactions.”). The Court is suggesting that the transaction is commercial and
the Sherman Act could apply if litigated properly. Id.
144. White v. NCAA, No. CV 06-0999-RGK (MANx), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101374,
at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2006).
145. Id.
146. Id. (explaining that expenses not covered include travel costs, insurance, laundry,
incidental costs, etc.).
147. Id.
148. Verdict and Settlement Summary, White v. NCAA, No. CV 06-0999 RGK (MANx),
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1013741 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2006) (No. CV 06-0999 RGK), 2008 WL
612046 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2008).
149. Id.
150. Oliver v. NCAA, 920 N.E. 2d 203 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2009).
151. Id. at 207-08.
152. Id. at 207.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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student-athlete ‘by professional and commercial enterprises.’ ” 155 The
court was also not convinced that the rules rationally promoted
amateurism.156 The court ruled in favor of Oliver, but ultimately vacated
the judgment in exchange for a settlement of $750,000.157
3. Name, Image, and Likeness
In order to protect the sanctity of Amateurism, the NCAA requires
every Division I student-athlete to authorize use of their “name or picture
. . . to generally promote NCAA championships or other NCAA events,
activities or programs.”158 Not only are student-athletes required to
authorize the NCAA to use their name or picture at no cost, but they have
been prohibited from profiting in any way from their own name, image,
or likeness.159 A recent court case brought this rule to the attention of
the media and public.
Ed O’Bannon, a former All-American basketball player at UCLA,
played professional basketball for several years before settling down and
eventually working for a car dealership in Nevada.160 In 2008, a friend’s
son told O’Bannon that he was a character in a college basketball video
game.161 The boy turned on the video game and showed O’Bannon the
virtual version of himself.162 This player wore a UCLA jersey with the
same number O’Bannon wore at UCLA163 and displayed O’Bannon’s
physical characteristics.164 O’Bannon was shocked; he had never given
permission for the use of his likeness in a video game and he had not
been compensated for it.165
In 2009, O’Bannon sued the NCAA, the Collegiate Licensing
Company (CLC),166 and multiple member schools for commercial use.167
155. Id. at 214.
156. Oliver v. NCAA, 920 N.E. 2d 203, 214-15 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2009).
157. Id. at 218-19; Aaron Sorenson, Oliver vs NCAA Settled, NCSA,
https://www.ncsasports.org/blog/2009/10/12/3456/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2021).
158. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 12.5.1.1.1 (Promotions Involving NCAA
Championships, Events, Activities, or Programs).
159. Id. § 12.1.2 (prohibiting athletes from accepting payments “in any form”).
160. Associated Press, Ex-UCLA star Ed O’Bannon selling cars, taking on NCAA over
pay,
INDY
STAR
(Feb.
19,
2014,
1:27
PM),
https://www.indystar.com/story/sports/2014/02/19/ex-ucla-star-ed-obannon-selling-carstaking-on-ncaa-over-pay/5609947/.
161. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that video game
was produced by software company Electronic Arts (EA)).
162. Id.
163. Id. (explaining that O’Bannon wore number 31 jersey while on UCLA basketball
team).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. (CLC licenses trademarks of NCAA).
167. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1055.
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O’Bannon alleged that the defendants violated the Sherman Act by
preventing student-athletes from being compensated for the use of their
name, image, and likeness.168 O’Bannon argued that the NCAA had
been successful at carrying out this exploitation because student-athletes
were required to sign agreements that relinquished all rights in perpetuity
to the commercial use of their name, image, and likeness.169 The district
court ruled in favor of O’Bannon170 and the decision was appealed to the
Ninth Circuit.
The Ninth Circuit applied the rule of reason standard and agreed
with the district court’s recognition of the relevant cognizable market, a
“college education market” where colleges compete for athletic services
by offering recruits scholarships, amenities, facilities, and coaching
staff.171 They further agreed with the finding that the NCAA’s
compensation rules function to “extinguish” a form of competition
among schools seeking elite recruits.172 However, restricting trade is
only unreasonable under the rule of reason standard when there are no
legitimate procompetitive justifications or substantially less restrictive
means to achieve the goal.173
The NCAA’s procompetitive justifications for the compensation
rules were “(1) promoting amateurism, (2) promoting competitive
balance among NCAA schools, (3) integrating student-athletes with
their schools’ academic community, and (4) increasing output in the
college education market.”174 The Ninth Circuit recognized promoting
amateurism as a legitimate procompetitive purpose for the NCAA to
pursue.175 The Ninth Circuit did not find substantially less restrictive
means to promote amateurism than the rule prohibiting compensation
for name, image, and likeness.176 The court ultimately held that the
NCAA must allow colleges to pay for the full cost of attendance,177 but

168. Id.
169. O’Bannon v. NCAA, No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19170, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 8, 2010).
170. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1056 (recounting the district court’s conclusion that
prohibiting student-athletes from receiving compensation for their name, image, and likeness
violates the Sherman Act).
171. Id. at 1070.
172. Id. at 1071.
173. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 88, 90 (1984).
174. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1072.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1074.
177. Id. at 1078-79; see also Michael McCann, Stakes and Stakeholders in Alston v.
NCAA, the Latest College Sports Antitrust Case, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 4, 2018),
https://www.si.com/college/2018/09/04/alston-v-ncaa-trial-news-updates-ncaa-costattendance (“[C]ollege athletes can now accept athletic performance bonuses related to
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that the rule of reason did not require allowing students to receive cash
for use of their name, image, and likeness.178
Division I football and basketball players filed several antitrust
actions against the NCAA and multiple Division I conferences during
the course of the O’Bannon litigation.179 These actions were
consolidated into one action known as “The Alston Litigation.”180 The
Alston district court concluded that the NCAA’s compensation rules
have severe anticompetitive effects in the Division I market.181 The
district court relied on NCAA testimony, student-athlete survey
evidence, and demand analyses to conclude that “caps on non-cash,
education-related benefits have no demand-preserving effect and,
therefore, lack a procompetitive justification.”182 The district court held
that “NCAA compensation limits preserve demand to the extent they
prevent unlimited cash payments akin to professional salaries, but not
insofar as they restrict certain education-related benefits.”183
On appeal, the NCAA urged the Ninth Circuit to vacate the
injunction because the ruling illegally encroached upon the NCAA’s role
as the “superintendent of college sports” and was impermissibly
vague.184 On cross-appeal, the student-athletes urged the Ninth Circuit
to broaden the injunction because the “district court should have
enjoined all NCAA compensation limits, including those on payments
untethered to education.”185 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the holdings and
injunction from the district court, finding that the “district court struck
the right balance in crafting a remedy that both prevents anticompetitive
harm to [s]tudent-[a]thletes while serving the procompetitive purpose of

Olympic participation, obtain unlimited snacks and meals, and finance the purchase of lossof-value insurance through borrowing against future earnings.”).
178. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1079; see also McCann, supra note 177 (“As a separate
component of O’Bannon’s litigation, Electronic Arts agreed to a settlement whereby the video
game publisher paid about $40 million to more than 29,000 current and former college
players.”).
179. In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig.
(Alston II), 958 F.3d 1239, 1247 (9th Cir. 2020).
180. Id.
181. In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig.
(Alston I), 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2019), aff’d, 958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2020)
(“[E]lite student-athletes lack any viable alternatives to Division I, they are forced to accept,
to the extent they want to attend college and play sports at an elite level after high school,
whatever compensation is offered to them by Division I schools, regardless of whether any
such compensation is an accurate reflection of the competitive value of their athletic
services.”).
182. Alston II, 958 F.3d at 1257-58.
183. Id. at 1260.
184. Id. at 1263.
185. Id.
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preserving the popularity of college sports.”186 On October 15, 2020, the
NCAA petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to grant review of the Ninth
Circuit’s holding.187 On December 16, 2020, the Supreme Court of the
United States granted the NCAA’s petition for writ of certiorari.188
D. Fair Pay to Play Legislation
At the state level, California decided to be the first state to make a
legislative move in the name, image, and likeness debate.189 California
Senator, Nancy Skinner, introduced Senate Bill 206, known as the “Fair
Pay to Play Act” in February of 2019.190 The bill allows college athletes
in California to profit off their name, image, and likeness, sign
endorsement deals, and seek representation without being penalized by
their university or the NCAA.191 The bill passed unanimously through
both the California Assembly and Senate,192 and Governor Gavin
Newsom publicly signed the bill on September 27, 2019 on LeBron
James’ HBO show, The Shop.193 The bill will go into effect on January
1, 2023, giving the NCAA time to work with California and other states
alike.194
Advocates for the bill argue that “restricting compensation amounts
to discrimination against college athletes—it’s near impossible to name
another group of people who are prohibited from financially benefiting
186. Id.
187. Remy, supra note 10. According to Donald Remy, NCAA Chief Legal Officer,
The ruling blurs the line between student-athletes and professionals, conflicts with
prior appellate court decisions, appoints a single court to micromanage collegiate
sports, and encourages never-ending litigation following every rule change. The
decision extends beyond the NCAA’s ability to govern college sports throughout
the country, affecting how other joint ventures operate. It is critical for the Supreme
Court to address the consequential legal errors in this case so that college sports can
be governed, not by the courts, but by those who interact with and lead students
every day. Together with our conferences that were individually sued in this matter,
we will continue to defend the line between professional sports and college sports.
Id.
188. In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958
F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. granted, 2020 WL 7366281 (U.S. Dec. 16, 2020) (No. 20512).
189. See Sean Gregory, How California’s Historic NCAA Fair Pay Law Will Change
College
Sports
for
the
Better,
TIME
(Oct.
1,
2019,
8:16
AM),
https://time.com/5689548/california-ncaa-law/.
190. Press Release, Senator Nancy Skinner, Gov. Newsom Signs SB 206, the ‘Fair Pay to
Play Act,’ (Sept. 30, 2019), https://sd09.senate.ca.gov/news/20190930-gov-newsom-signssb-206-%E2%80%98fair-pay-play-act%E2%80%99 [hereinafter CA Senate News].
191. See generally S.B. 206, 2019-2020, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019), CAL. EDUC. CODE §
67456 (effective Jan. 1, 2023).
192. Gregory, supra note 189.
193. Id.
194. See CA Senate News, supra note 190.
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from their unique talents.”195 Senator Skinner used Katelyn Ohashi,
former UCLA gymnast, as the prime example;196 a video of Ohashi’s
gymnastics floor routine went viral and unlike her non-athlete
classmates, she was prohibited from monetizing her sixty million
YouTube followers.197
Even though the NCAA and PAC-12 initially pushed back on
California, other states followed California’s lead.198 Florida filed a bill
that mimics SB206.199 New York passed the “New York Collegiate
Athletic Participation Compensation Act,” which embodies the same
goals as California’s “Fair Pay to Play Act,” but takes it one step
further.200 The New York law stipulates that fifteen percent of the
revenue must be distributed back to student-athletes.201 Colorado’s bill
gives student-athletes a right to sue if the NCAA pushes back against
name, images, and likeness rights granted by the bill.202 South Carolina
and Pennsylvania have plans of enacting similar bills.203
The NCAA said it has been backed into a corner because a
patchwork of state laws will make it impossible for NCAA members to
compete on a level playing field.204 When the NCAA realized that
California and other states would not back down, the NCAA Board of
Governors created a federal and state legislation working group to
conduct an investigation and make recommendations.205 The working
195. Gregory, supra note 189.
196. See CA Senate News, supra note 190.
197. Id.; Katelyn Ohashi, Opinion, Everyone Made Money Off My N.C.A.A Career, Except
Me, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/09/opinion/katelynohashi-fair-play-act.html.
198. Gregory, supra note 189.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Gregg Clifton, New York Senate Bill To Require Student Athletes To Share In
University
Ticket
Revenue,
JDSUPRA
(Sept.
23,
2019),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/new-york-senate-bill-to-require-student-76744/
(reporting that Senator Parker envisions the revenue being divided equally among all studentathletes because he thinks that the money represents the value of the labor.).
202. Charlotte Carrol, Tracking NCAA Fair Play Legislation Across the Country, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.si.com/college/2019/10/02/tracking-ncaa-fairplay-image-likeness-laws.
203. Gregory, supra note 189.
204. See NCAA Media Center, NCAA responds to California Senate Bill 206, NCAA
(Sept. 11, 2019, 10:08 AM), https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/ncaaresponds-california-senate-bill-206.
205. NCAA BD. OF GOVERNORS FED. & STATE LEGISLATION WORKING GRP., FINAL
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1, 4 (2020) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS] (“The Board created the working group to study whether the
Association should maintain its opposition to the proposed state and federal legislation, or
whether it should work to develop a process whereby a student-athlete could be compensated
for use of his or her [name, image, or likeness] in a fashion that would be consistent with the
NCAA’s core values, mission and principles.”).
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group’s report indicated that, “[w]hile there was significant desire to
modernize the NCAA’s rules related to student-athlete [name, image,
and likeness], NCAA members overwhelmingly indicated that the
Association should not make rules changes that would undermine, or
fundamentally change, the NCAA’s overall model of amateur
intercollegiate athletics.”206 On April 17, 2020, the working group
released its final report and recommendations.207 The Division I council
was set to vote on the proposed measures in January 2021.208 However,
“[d]ue to recent judicial, political and governmental enforcement events,
all three divisions tabled or withdrew votes on changes to how studentathletes can use their name, image and likeness.”209 If the NCAA
eventually adopts the measures proposed by the working group, the
measures will:
Allow student-athletes to use their name, image and likeness to
promote camps and clinics, private lessons, their own products and
services, and commercial products or services.210
Allow student-athletes to be paid for their autographs and personal
appearances.211
Allow student-athletes to crowdfund for nonprofits or charitable
organizations, catastrophic events and family hardships, as well as
for educational expenses not covered by cost of attendance.212
Allow student-athletes the opportunity to use professional advice
and marketing assistance regarding name, image and likeness
activities, as well as professional representation in contract
negotiations related to name, image and likeness activities, with
some restrictions.213
Prohibit schools from being involved in the development, operation
or promotion of a student-athlete’s business activity, unless the

206. FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 205, at 1, 6.
207. See generally id.
208. NCAA Media Center, DI Council introduces name, image and likeness concepts into
legislative
cycle,
NCAA
(Oct.
14,
2020,
3:05
PM),
https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/di-council-introduces-nameimage-and-likeness-concepts-legislative-cycle [hereinafter NCAA Media Center, DI
Council].
209. NCAA Media Center, Student-athlete committees issue joint statement on name,
image, likeness legislation delay, NCAA (Jan. 15, 2021, 1:36 PM),
https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/student-athlete-committees-issuejoint-statement-name-image-likeness-legislation-delay?division=d1.
210. NCAA Media Center, DI Council, supra note 208.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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activity is developed as part of a student’s coursework or academic
program.214
Prohibit schools from arranging or securing endorsement
opportunities for student-athletes.215

III. THE LEGAL PROBLEM
Even though the NCAA is finally considering modernizing the
name, image, and likeness rules, the NCAA is not doing enough to end
the Sherman Act debate. There is still a lingering problem that the
NCAA refuses to address: the inconsistent and unnecessary principle of
amateurism.216 NCAA officials themselves have conceded that there is
no fixed definition for amateurism.217 Mike Slive, former SEC
Commissioner, “testified that amateurism is ‘just a concept that I don’t
even know what it means. I really don’t.’ ” 218 Justice Thomas, in his
dissenting opinion in O’Bannon, referred to amateurism as a “nebulous
concept prone to ever-changing definition.”219 Courts, including the
Ninth Circuit, have recognized promoting amateurism as a legitimate
procompetitive purpose for the NCAA to pursue.220 Yet how can that be
accepted when no one really knows what amateurism is? Allowing the
NCAA to use the principle of amateurism as a procompetitive
justification for anticompetitive rules is allowing the NCAA to
commercially exploit student-athletes by taking advantage of an
ambiguous and malleable term.
Even though the principle of amateurism purports to prioritize
education for student-athletes, that is not the reality.221 Practices of fraud
and deceit run rampant at the top intercollegiate football and basketball
schools.222 Coaches are paying players under the table and professors
are being pressured to give certain athletes grades they do not deserve.223
The pressure to perform as an athlete is greater than the expectation to

214. Id.
215. Id.
216. FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 205, at 1, 6 (“NCAA members
overwhelmingly indicated that the Association should not make rules changes that would
undermine, or fundamentally change, the NCAA’s overall model of amateur intercollegiate
athletics.”).
217. In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig.
(Alston II), 958 F.3d 1239, 1259 (9th Cir. 2020).
218. Id.
219. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1083 (9th Cir. 2015) (Thomas, C.J., dissenting).
220. Id. at 1073.
221. See Branch, supra note 3.
222. Id.
223. Id.
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perform as a student and, to make matters worse, students are commonly
expected to play through injuries.224
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Principle of Amateurism is Not Consistent with Reality
Now that Courts have successfully established a relevant
cognizable market, the college education market, it is clear that the
Sherman Act applies to the transactions made between colleges and
prospective student-athletes.225 Within the college education market,
colleges compete for athletic services by offering recruits scholarships,
amenities, facilities and coaching staff.226 Many of the NCAA’s rules
function to extinguish a form of competition among the schools seeking
elite recruits.227 Although some rules may be necessary to promote
education and create a level playing field for the universities involved,
the NCAA should not be permitted to hide behind the principle of
amateurism for anticompetitive rules.
1. Amateurism Does Not Keep College Sports “Pure”
The NCAA’s argument that the principle of amateurism keeps
college sports “pure” is contradicted by the NCAA’s commercial
practices.228 The origin of the word amateur is the Latin word amator,
meaning ‘lover.’229 The principle of amateurism derives from the notion
that a sport is “pure” when people play for the love of the game, rather
than compensation.230 As pleasant as this may sound, the NCAA’s
dream of purity is hypocritical given the millions of dollars in revenue it
receives each year through the free labor of student-athletes.231 In 2019,
the NCAA reported spending more than $18.8 billion on athletics, “[o]f
that figure, $3.6 billion went toward financial aid for student-athletes,
224. Id.; see generally Stephanie A. Stadden, The Influence of Athletic Identity,
Expectation of Toughness, and Attitude Toward Pain and Injury on Athletes’ Help-Seeking
Tendencies (2007) (unpublished Pd.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina at
Greensboro), https://libres.uncg.edu/ir/uncg/f/umi-uncg-1396.pdf.
225. See O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1070 (9th Cir. 2015).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 1071.
228. See Branch, supra note 3 (“Big-time college sports are fully commercialized. Billions
of dollars flow through them each year. The NCAA makes money, and enables universities
and corporations to make money, from the unpaid labor of young athletes.”).
229. Ross Andrews, Push to allow professional athletes took hold in 1968 Olympic
Games,
ASU
GLOBAL
SPORT
INST.
(Oct.
15,
2018),
https://globalsportmatters.com/mexico/2018/10/15/professional-athletes-1968-olympicgames/.
230. Id.
231. See Branch, supra note 3.
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and $3.7 billion was spent on coaches compensation.”232 At first glance,
this may sound fair because the NCAA commits a similar amount to
coaches and students. However, this is unfair considering there are far
fewer coaches than student-athletes.233 Over the years, coaches’ salaries
have multiplied, yet the student-athletes have only recently been
afforded the right to a “full scholarship.”234 The salaries of college
football coaches are at a record high; as of November 2020, Alabama’s
Nick Saban’s salary is $9,300,000, Louisiana State’s Ed Orgeron’s
salary is $8,919,500, Clemson’s Dabo Swinney’s salary is $8,319,775,
and Michigan’s Jim Harbaugh’s salary is $8,036,179.235 If the NCAA
were to dedicate more money to student-athlete financial aid and less to
coaches, it would be more difficult for universities to afford these
exorbitant coaches’ salaries.
The notion of purity is also contradicted by the universities’ and
NCAA’s use of student-athletes to endorse corporate brands.236 Students
have not been allowed to benefit from their own popularity, but the
NCAA is allowed to sell that popularity for a large profit.237 The NCAA
and the universities sell corporate advertisement space on the jerseys and
helmets of the student-athletes.238 A further example of the NCAA’s
hypocrisy can be found in the summary tax form required of nonprofits;
in 2006 the NCAA, a “non-profit organization,” spent almost $1 million
chartering private jets.239 It is not radical to suggest that these funds
could be spent more responsibly, such as contributing to the studentathlete scholarship fund.
2. Amateurism is Not Essential for College Sports to Remain
Popular
The NCAA’s argument that amateurism is essential for college
sports to remain successful and popular is unfounded.240 The NCAA

232. NCAA
Research,
Finances
of
Intercollegiate
Athletics,
NCAA,
https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/finances-intercollegiate-athletics (last visited
Feb. 13, 2021).
233. Players outnumber coaches even at the top college football schools, where there tends
to be “one coach for every four to five” football players. Why College Football Teams Have
So Many Coaches, FOX BUS. (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.foxbusiness.com/features/whycollege-football-teams-have-so-many-coaches.
234. BYERS & HAMMER, supra note 31, at 9.
235. NCAA Salaries, USA TODAY, https://sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/salaries/ (last visited
Feb. 13, 2021).
236. See Branch, supra note 3.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 117 (1984).
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claims that a major reason fans watch college sports is for the “amateur”
game, and fans would lose interest if student-athletes were
compensated.241 However, no market research has been presented to
support this argument.242 On the contrary, the Ninth Circuit recognized
that “the evidence presented at trial suggests that consumer demand for
[Football Bowl Subdivision] football and Division I basketball-related
products is not driven by the restrictions on student-athlete
compensation but instead by other factors, such as school loyalty and
geography.”243
Just as the NCAA is arguing now, the Olympics initially
contended that “the Olympic spirit would be lost once professionals
were allowed to participate.”244 In the 1980s, the Olympics started
allowing professional athletes to compete and it is still revered by
viewers as a pure and enjoyable spectacle.245 “Olympic officials, who
had once disdained the NCAA for offering scholarships in exchange
for athletic performance, came to welcome millionaire athletes from
every quarter, while the NCAA still refused to let the pro Olympian
Michael Phelps swim for his college team at Michigan.” 246
Abolishing amateurism actually increased viewership of the Olympics
rather than decreased it, in part, because people enjoy watching athletes
they know.247 The Olympics’ story not only disproves the NCAA’s
theory that amateurism and popularity have a positive correlation, but
also provides a successful image of what the NCAA could become.248
3. Amateurism is More Detrimental to Education than Helpful
The NCAA’s argument that amateurism allows student-athletes to
receive a proper education is misguided. The NCAA’s assertion that
“student-athletes derive long term benefits from participating fully in
academic life at their schools” is not disputed.249 The NCAA argues that
compensation rules encourage this integration for student-athletes.250
However, the Ninth Circuit was not convinced by this argument, finding
that “these benefits are achieved by other NCAA rules—such as those
241. Id.
242. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1082 (9th Cir. 2015).
243. Id.
244. Andrews, supra note 229.
245. See id.
246. Branch, supra note 3.
247. Bob Greene, Opinion, What changed the Olympics forever, CNN (July 23, 2012,
11:43
AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2012/07/22/opinion/greene-olympicsamateurs/index.html.
248. See id.
249. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1059 (9th Cir. 2015).
250. Id.
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requiring student-athletes to attend class, prohibiting athletes-only
dorms, and forbidding student-athletes to practice more than a certain
number of hours per week.”251 In reality, student-athletes in financial
need are often unable to fully integrate because scholarships do not
provide them with enough funds and rigorous practice schedules do not
leave time for a job.252 Green’s story is a prime example of this; he sold
the jersey in order to afford a spring break trip with friends.253 The
NCAA severely punished him for this act, all the while exploiting his
talents by selling their own version of his jersey in the university store.254
The NCAA emphasizes that intercollegiate athletes are “students”
before “athletes.”255 Universities strive to educate the whole person and
competitive athletics are an extracurricular activity directed at achieving
that goal.256 This ideological perspective is not the reality for many
college athletes or for the universities.257 First, if education were the
most important objective, the salaries of professors would be
comparable to coaches; however, this is not the case. “[T]he average
compensation for head football coaches at public universities, now
more than $2 million, has grown 750 percent (adjusted for inflation)
since the [Bd. of Regents] decision in 1984; that’s more than 20 times
the cumulative 32 percent raise for college professors.”258 Second,
although it is not codified, significant pressures often demand that
student-athletes place their sport above all else.259
Universities with major athletic departments that rely on their
football or basketball teams to bring in large streams of revenue are
notorious for disregarding academic shortcomings of their studentathletes.260 In the 1980s, Jan Kemp, an English instructor at the
University of Georgia, was fired for refusing to inflate student-athlete
grades in her remedial English courses.261 Just before the 1982 Sugar
Bowl, in an effort to ensure eligibility of key players, administrators
replaced the failing grades of nine football players with passing
251. Id. at 1060.
252. See Jasmine Harris, It’s naive to think college athletes have time for school,
CONVERSATION (Oct. 9, 2018, 6:55 AM), https://theconversation.com/its-naive-to-thinkcollege-athletes-have-time-for-school-100942.
253. See supra Part II.C.1.
254. See Branch, supra note 3.
255. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 2.9.
256. JAMES J. DUDERSTADT, INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS AND THE AMERICAN
UNIVERSITY: A UNIVERSITY PRESIDENT’S PERSPECTIVE 70 (2000).
257. See Harris, supra note 252.
258. Branch, supra note 3.
259. See Harris, supra note 252.
260. Branch, supra note 3.
261. Id.
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grades.262 Kemp testified that when she refused to fix a grade, a
supervisor at the university “bellowed, ‘who do you think is more
important to this university, you or Dominique Wilkins?’ ” 263 Kemp
was traumatized by the hate she received for turning in the beloved
athletics department.264
Jasmine Harris, a sociology professor at a Division I football
and basketball school, conducted research on the academic
experiences of black Division I men’s basketball and football
players.265 She found that this group spends roughly “three times as
many hours per week on athletics as they do on academics,”
averaging more than twenty-five hours per week on athletics and
only eight hours per week on academics. 266 Harris disagrees with the
NCAA’s view that Division I student-athletes are students before
athletes, she believes, “[r]ecent academic scandals—from fraudulent
classes to inappropriate tutor support and administrative cover-ups—
reveal that a sports-first mentality permeates college campuses.” 267
Dexter Manley, a former college football player, is living proof that
education is not a priority for many Division I athletics programs.268
Later in his life, while playing in the NFL, he admitted that he never
learned how to read while in college.269
The no draft and no agent rules, justified by the principle of
amateurism, are also examples of how the NCAA is anticompetitive at
the cost of student-athlete education.270 If the NCAA truly wanted
student-athletes to receive a proper education, it would welcome back
student-athletes who were not selected during a professional draft or who
negotiated with a professional team but ultimately decided to stay in
college. The two baseball players, Paxton and Oliver, who were
punished by the NCAA for attempting to make an educated choice
between joining a professional baseball team and remaining in
college,271 are living proof that the NCAA would rather scare student262. Id.
263. Id. (describing Dominique Wilkins as a star basketball player at University of
Georgia).
264. Id.
265. Harris, supra note 252.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. See BYERS & HAMMER, supra note 31, at 238.
269. Id.
270. Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1095 (7th Cir. 1992) (Flaum, J., concurring)
(arguing that a university that offers a student the ability to return to intercollegiate athletics
if the draft proves unsuccessful would be more attractive to an elite student-athlete than a
university declining to offer that opportunity).
271. See supra Part II.C.1-2.
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athletes out of considering other options than encouraging them to stay
and finish their education. The NCAA uses these fear tactics because it
does not want to lose profitable athletes to professional sports teams,
which is exactly the anticompetitive behavior the Sherman Act should
prevent. The NCAA’s no draft and no agent bylaws are anticompetitive
because the university would be more attractive to an athlete if it allowed
students to return to the collegiate team after participating in a
professional draft or working with an agent.272 Further, if the student
were allowed to return to their scholarship, that student would be more
likely to finish his or her education.
B. It Would be Difficult to Classify Student-Athletes as Employees
Some critics of the principle of amateurism argue that studentathletes should be compensated by the university as employees;273
however, this is not a simple solution. The workers’ compensation
cases involving Dennison and Waldrep274 trigger emotional
responses and make the NCAA appear evil, but the NCAA has a
practical reason for avoiding recognizing student-athletes as
employees. An employee is “[s]omeone who works in the service of
another person (the employer) under an express or implied contract of
hire.”275 If the NCAA was not tactful with its definition of “studentathlete,” the time commitment, coach-to-athlete dynamic, and the
expectations of college athletes could have been evidence of an implied
contract of hire. There are several reasons why the NCAA would wish
to avoid an express or implied contract of hire with student-athletes.
First, workers’ compensation laws hold employers strictly liable
for their employees’ injuries that occur in the scope of employment.276
Sports-related injuries are inevitable,277 and there are nearly 500,000
NCAA student-athletes competing in twenty-four sports every
year.278 The cost would be immense to insure workers’ compensation
benefits to this many people. Based on an analysis of student-athlete
272. Banks, 977 F.2d at 1095.
273. Abigail Johnson Hess, Majority of college students say student-athletes should be
paid,
survey
finds,
CNBC
(Sept.
11,
2019,
12:53
PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/11/student-athletes-should-get-paid-college-studentssay.html.
274. See supra Part II.B.
275. Employee, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
276. Workers’ Compensation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
277. See PT in Motion News, Sports and Recreation-Related Injuries Top 8.6 Million
Annually, APTA (Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.apta.org/news/2017/01/04/sports-andrecreation-related-injuries-top-8.6-million-annually.
278. Student-Athletes, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/student-athletes (last visited Dec.
18, 2020).
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injuries reported in NCAA championship sports, the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimated that 1,053,370
injuries occurred over a five-year period.279 The CDC also found
that an estimated 176.7 million athletes were exposed to potential
injury over that same five-year period.280
Second, an employer is subject to vicarious liability for the torts
of employees committed while acting in the scope of their
employment.281 This requirement would open the NCAA up to more
potential lawsuits and liability on behalf of their players, especially
while they are travelling for intercollegiate competition. Imagine a
scenario where a football player tackled another player during a
game, causing that player to become paralyzed. In this situation, the
university could be sued for vicarious liability because their player
was acting within the scope of his employment when he injured the
other player. It is unpredictable how high the costs could extend
when all of the potential damages are considered.
These two reasons for avoiding classifying student-athletes as
employees are troubling considering the vast amounts of revenue the
NCAA and member universities collect each year. It seems hard to
believe that funds could not be reorganized and reallocated to
appropriately insure and employ student-athletes. However, there is
a third reason that makes it the most difficult to classify studentathletes as employees.
Title IX prohibits any education program or activity that is
receiving federal financial assistance from denying participation or
benefits to anyone on the basis of sex.282 Title IX would require
universities or the NCAA to give equal pay to both female and male
student-athletes.283 This would be difficult because Division I men’s
football and basketball programs generate the bulk of the NCAA’s
revenue.284 The sports that are not profitable for the universities are
funded by the revenue generated from the profitable sports.285 If a large
portion of this money was used to pay student-athletes, less profitable

279. Zachary Y. Kerr et al., College Sports-Related Injuries—United States, 2009-10
Through 2013-14 Academic Years, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Dec. 11,
2015), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6448a2.htm.
280. Id.
281. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY: TORTS OF SERVANT § 219 (AM. LAW INST.
1958).
282. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1986).
283. See id.
284. See Erin E. Buzuvis, Athletic Compensation for Women Too? Title IX Implications
of Northwestern and O’Bannon, 41 J.C. & U.L. 297, 320-22 (2015).
285. See id. at 320.
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sports (often women’s sports) would likely be cut entirely.286 Cutting
women’s programs while maintaining men’s programs violates Title
IX.287 In order to get around this, universities could cut an equal number
of less profitable men’s and women’s sports to increase the budget for
the salaries of student-athletes in more profitable sports. This is also
problematic because it would help few student-athletes at the detriment
of the majority. If intercollegiate sports enhance collegiate life, it is in
the NCAA’s best interest to provide more opportunities for students to
participate in an intercollegiate sport, rather than less.
If the NCAA abolished the principle of amateurism and left the
employment decision to the universities, the universities could decide if
it were feasible to reorganize funds and employ student-athletes. In this
case, the NCAA could create rules that require universities to keep a
specific number of sports or prohibit universities from finding funds by
cutting sports. This rule might encourage universities to reduce
spending on facilities and coaching and redirect those funds to studentathletes.
Lastly, it is relevant to note that employment by the university does
not detract from a student’s educational experience. Many students work
for the university during their time in college, whether it be for the
recreation center, library, alumni donation center, etc. If intercollegiate
athletes were considered part-time employees of the university, they
would still be students and still be required to fulfill the NCAA’s class
attendance requirements.
C. Allowing Student-Athletes to Accept Compensation from ThirdParties for the use of Name, Image, and Likeness is a Step in the Right
Direction
The Fair Pay to Play scheme, as California has created it, does
not force the NCAA or universities to recognize student-athletes as
employees and it does not require the NCAA to compensate studentathletes out of its own budget.288
The Fair Pay to Play laws give student-athletes the right to enter
contracts with and be compensated by third parties.289 Many Division I
football and basketball players who come from urban, low-income
families feel pressure to quit college in order to financially support their
286. See id.
287. See id. at 323.
288. See S.B. 206, 2019-2020, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019), CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67456
(effective Jan. 1, 2023).
289. See S.B. 206, 2019-2020, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019), CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67456
(effective Jan. 1, 2023).

620

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:61

families.290 Through third-party compensation, players from lower
income communities could have an opportunity to receive income for
incidentals as well as the possibility of providing monetarily for their
family members.291
With the opportunity to receive third-party compensation, studentathletes will have more incentive to finish their education.292 For
example, in the 2017 National Basketball Association (NBA) draft, there
were twenty players who had completed only one year of college.293
Given the opportunity to sign a professional contract, student-athletes
may rationally choose to leave their university, where there is no
possibility of compensation and a high likelihood of injury. However, if
student-athletes were allowed to accept endorsement deals and the
university had a better fund to pay medical bills, the athletes may be
more inclined to complete their degree before going to the NBA. If the
NCAA wants to encourage student-athletes to be students first and take
education seriously, this would be a step in the right direction.
Some argue that amateur athletes will not be fiscally
responsible,294 but this argument infantilizes collegiate athletes. No
one is required to attend secondary education and any non-athlete
student at the university has a right to accept endorsement deals,
which are becoming more prevalent in this age of social media
influencers. Student-athletes who have gained popularity based on
their talent and hard work should not be treated any differently than
a theater major who accepts acting gigs while in college or monetizes
her YouTube channel.
D. Professional Athletes Competing at the Intercollegiate Level
Imagine a hypothetical situation in which a college football
player only uses one year of his collegiate football eligibility before
he is drafted by a professional NFL team. After several years, the
football player wants to retire from the NFL, but he is not ready to
give up competitive football. At age twenty-nine, he wants to finish
his education and play for a Division I college football team again.
The NCAA’s amateurism rules would prohibit him from playing
290. Malcolm Lemmons, College Athletes Getting Paid? Here Are Some Pros And Cons,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 29, 2017, 10:06 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/collegeathletes-getting-paid-here-are-some-pros-cons_b_58cfcee0e4b07112b6472f9a.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. NBA announces early entry candidates for 2017 NBA Draft, NBA (Apr. 25, 2017,
3:12 PM), https://www.nba.com/news/nba-announces-early-entry-candidates-2017-nbadraft.
294. Lemmons, supra note 290.
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college football because he has already played on a professional
football team.295 At first look, this seems reasonable; however, it
may not seem reasonable after considering a second scenario.
Imagine a second scenario in which a Division I college football
player enters the Major League Baseball (MLB) draft and signs a
professional baseball contract with the Oakland A’s for roughly a
$4.7 million bonus. This student-athlete would now be considered a
professional athlete,296 but the NCAA’s rules still allow him to
continue playing for the Division I college football team until his
baseball team requires him to leave.297 He also has the option to
come back to college football if he decides to leave his MLB career
down the road because the NCAA manual explicitly states, “[a]
professional athlete in one sport may represent a member institution
in a different sport and may receive institutional financial assistance
in the second sport.”298 The second scenario is based on Kyler
Murray’s story.299 “In baseball, Murray became a professional the
second he signed with the [Oakland Athletics’]. Having taken his
signing bonus, his college baseball career [was] over. But no NCAA
rule prevent[ed] him from playing football.” 300 Zach Von Rosenberg
was also able to take advantage of this NCAA rule.301 After Von
Rosenberg committed to LSU’s baseball team, he was drafted to the
MLB.302 When his baseball career was over, he returned to LSU, but
this time, as a twenty-nine-year-old freshman football player.303
295. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 12.1.2.
296. Id. § 12.02.11 (“A professional athlete is one who receives any kind of payment,
directly or indirectly, for athletics participation except as permitted by the governing
legislation of the Association.”).
297. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 12.1.3; see also Alex Kirshner, Why Kyler Murray
is NCAA-eligible for Oklahoma despite signing a baseball contract, SBNATION (Sept. 1,
2018, 11:30 AM), https://www.sbnation.com/college-football/2018/9/1/17432194/kylermurray-ncaa-eligible-mlb-draft.
298. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 12.1.3.
299. Kirshner, supra note 297. Kyler Murray ultimately backed out of his contract with
the Oakland A’s and committed himself to football. Tyler Kepner, In the Case of Kyler
Murray, the A’s Bet Big and Lost, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/11/sports/kyle-murray-oakland-athletics-football.html.
Murray, the first NFL draft pick in 2019, signed with the Arizona Cardinals. Jeremy Bergman,
Kyler Murray signs rookie deal with Arizona Cardinals, NFL (May 9, 2019, 11:53 AM),
https://www.nfl.com/news/kyler-murray-signs-rookie-deal-with-arizona-cardinals0ap3000001030425.
300. Kirshner, supra note 297.
301. Howie Kussoy, How 29-year-old became LSU’s punter after MLB dream died, N.Y.
POST (Dec. 27, 2019, 12:31 AM), https://nypost.com/2019/12/27/how-29-year-old-becamelsus-punter-after-mlb-dream-died/.
302. Id.
303. Id.; 2020 Football Roster, LSU, https://lsusports.net/sports/football/roster/zach-vonrosenberg/24322 (last visited Jan. 9, 2021).
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Murray and Von Rosenberg are not the only professional athletes
who have played on NCAA teams.304
When considering the first hypothetical, one might find it unfair
for a twenty-nine-year-old professional athlete to compete with and
against eighteen-year-old college freshman athletes. However, the
NCAA rules already allow professional athletes, such as Murray and
Von Rosenberg, to do just that.305 The fact that professional athletes
are already allowed to compete begs the question of how much would
really change if the first hypothetical described were permissible.
V. PROPOSAL
A. The United States Supreme Court Should Definitively Hold that the
Principle of Amateurism is Not a Legitimate Procompetitive Purpose
for the NCAA to Pursue
In the Spring of 2021, the United States Supreme Court will
decide306 “whether the Ninth Circuit erroneously held, in conflict with
decisions of other circuits and general antitrust principles, that the
[NCAA’s] eligibility rules regarding compensation of student-athletes
violate federal antitrust law.”307 The NCAA contends that the “NCAA
eligibility rules designed to ensure that student-athletes are not paid to
play their sport should be upheld against antitrust challenge without trial
and detailed analysis.”308
It is appropriate for the Supreme Court to apply a rule of reason
analysis, as it did in Bd. of Regents because the NCAA’s compensation
rules have severe anticompetitive effects in the Division I market.309 The
Supreme Court should affirm the lower court’s finding that “caps on
304. See Scott Jenkins, Kyler Murray and 4 Other NFL Players Who Picked Football
Over Baseball, SPORTSCASTING (June 14, 2019), https://www.sportscasting.com/kylermurray-nfl-players-football-over-baseball/.
305. Kirshner, supra note 297.
306. Jessica Gresko, High court agrees to hear NCAA athlete compensation case, AP
NEWS (Dec. 16, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/athlete-compensation-basketball-elenakagan-football-us-supreme-court-4fa2fc30e1a3f21329f4ec22cc55bb28; see In re Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir.
2020), cert. granted, 2020 WL 7366281 (U.S. Dec. 16, 2020) (No. 20-512).
307. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 86, at (i).
308. Id. at 9.
309. In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig.
(Alston I), 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2019), aff’d, 958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2020)
(“[E]lite student-athletes lack any viable alternatives to Division I, they are forced to accept,
to the extent they want to attend college and play sports at an elite level after high school,
whatever compensation is offered to them by Division I schools, regardless of whether any
such compensation is an accurate reflection of the competitive value of their athletic
services.”).
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non-cash, education-related benefits have no demand-preserving effect
and, therefore, lack a procompetitive justification.”310
While Courts have allowed the NCAA to get away with using the
principle of amateurism as a legitimate procompetitive purpose for
anticompetitive restraints, the NCAA’s justifications for upholding the
principle of amateurism can be refuted.311 Further, the NCAA’s
definition of amateurism has been inconsistent because the NCAA has
been forced to change the rules to address certain realities.312 For
example, student-athletes generally cannot receive any compensation
outside of their scholarship, but the NCAA allows tennis players to
accept up to $10,000 in prize money before college.313
Even though the NCAA will likely modernize the name, image, and
likeness rules after the council’s vote in January, the NCAA will not
voluntarily let go of the principle of amateurism.314 The ever-changing
principle of amateurism has caused confusion and divide in the lower
courts.315 In order to avoid inconsistent rulings and to force the NCAA
to change, the Supreme Court of the United States should definitively
hold that the principle of amateurism is not a legitimate procompetitive
purpose for the NCAA to pursue.
In 1984, the Supreme Court stated, “[i]n order to preserve the
character and quality of the ‘product,’ athletes must not be paid, must be
required to attend class, and the like.”316 As this Note points out, the
principle of amateurism has evolved since 1984 and it no longer
accomplishes the NCAA’s original goals. The Supreme Court for Alston
should not feel bound by the dicta of the 1984 Supreme Court because
the principle of amateurism is no longer necessary to preserve the
character and quality of the product.
B. The NCAA Should Stop Adhering to the Principle of Amateurism
and Create a Line of Demarcation Between College and Professional
Athletics by Redefining the Term “Student-Athlete”
Currently, NCAA Rule 12.01.1 states, “[o]nly an amateur
student-athlete is eligible for intercollegiate athletics participation in
a particular sport.”317 The NCAA should remove the word amateur
310. In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig.
(Alston II), 958 F.3d 1239, 1257-58 (9th Cir. 2020).
311. See supra Part IV.A.1-3.
312. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2015).
313. Id.
314. Remy, supra note 10.
315. See supra Part II.C.2.
316. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 102 (1984).
317. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, § 12.01.1.
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from this rule and all rules requiring an adherence to the principle of
amateurism. Removing the amateurism requirement does not mean
that the NCAA will be unable to establish a clear line of demarcation
between college athletics and professional athletics. The NCAA can
establish this distinction by redefining the term “student-athlete” to
ensure that the education of student-athletes is taken seriously.
Rather than focus on compensation as the difference between a
student-athlete and a professional athlete, the difference should be
that, unlike the professional athlete, the student-athlete is not only
dedicated to athletic competition, but is simultaneously focused on
receiving a university education.
The NCAA should not care whether someone has previously
received compensation as a result of athletic skill, whether someone
has entered a draft, or whether someone used an agent to negotiate
with professional teams. The NCAA should only worry about
whether or not the current student-athlete is following the education
and practice related requirements. These changes would redirect the
NCAA’s rules to a more student-focused approach, rather than an
exploitative approach.
C. The Universities Should Improve the Curriculum Options Offered to
Student-Athletes
First, universities should be allowed and encouraged to offer all
intercollegiate athletes the option to finish their degree with a
scholarship, even after maintaining a professional athletic career.
Next, the NCAA should work with universities to implement a
curriculum change. Some people use an intercollegiate sport as a way
to pay for an education, but other people play a Division I intercollegiate
sport as an eligibility requirement for a professional team. For example,
a football player cannot enter the NFL draft until he has used up his
college eligibility.318 Similarly, “[t]he NBA’s current rules require U.S.
players to be 19 and one year removed from high school, which has led
many elite high school players to use college basketball as a one-year
waypoint before turning pro.”319 Universities should create and offer a
318. The Rules of the Draft, NFL FOOTBALL OPERATIONS, https://operations.nfl.com/theplayers/the-nfl-draft/the-rules-of-thedraft/#:~:text=Player%20Eligibility,the%20next%20college%20football%20season
(last
visited Jan. 4, 2021).
319. Emily Giambalvo, NCAA to allow more flexibility for college basketball players
considering
the
NBA,
WASH.
POST
(Aug.
8,
2018,
3:57
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/colleges/ncaa-to-allow-more-flexibility-for-collegebasketball-players-considering-the-nba/2018/08/08/54a13e5a-9b3c-11e8-8d5ec6c594024954_story.html.
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relevant major for these sport-focused students. If someone wants to
become an artist, he or she has the right to major in art or attend a
secondary institution dedicated to art.
Similarly, music and theatre are standard majors at most
universities. If someone hopes to make it on Broadway, he or she may
major in theater and try out for professional roles on the side. An interest
in athletics is no different from an interest in art, music, or theater. One
could argue that it would be wasteful to offer a major dedicated to
athletics because “the likelihood of a . . . college athlete becoming a
professional athlete is very low,”320 but the chances of becoming a
profitable artist, musician, or actor/actress are also extremely slim, yet
students with these goals have the freedom to choose a major.
Individuals have the right to choose a life path, some people choose to
give themselves more options and other people put all of their eggs in
one basket. Student-athletes are not less capable of making thoughtful
life decisions than other students.
The athletics major would still require completion of general
education requirements, but would also include classes on coaching,
basic money management and investment, understanding taxes,
knowing one’s rights, etc. If a student has no educational interests, he
or she might as well be required to take classes that will benefit his or
her life. Rather than continue with the current system, where a large
portion of the football team is told to take Swahili321 or where academic
counselors push athletes into fraudulent, no-show classes to keep them
eligible to play their sport,322 universities should embrace a new concept
of the student-athlete.
The new curriculum would create a special system for studentathletes, no matter what major they decide, where they are not required
to take courses during season (nor prohibited from) and they work with
an academic counselor to plan the bulk of their courses during other
320. NCAA Research, Estimated probability of competing in professional athletics,
NCAA,
https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/estimated-probability-competingprofessional-athletics (last visited Jan. 4, 2021). The NCAA estimates “that 4.2% of drafteligible Division I [men’s basketball] players were chosen in the 2019 NBA draft (52 / 1,224)”
and “that 3.8% of draft-eligible Division I [football] players were chosen in the 2019 NFL
draft (249 / 6,490).” Id.
321. See Joe Nocera, Opinion, Football and Swahili, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/10/opinion/nocera-football-and-swahili.html (reporting
that in 2006, seven of twenty-five freshmen football players at the University of North
Carolina took a Swahili course).
322. Jon Solomon, UNC Investigation: Athletes pushed into fake classes by counselors,
CBSSPORTS.COM (Oct. 22, 2014. 10:36 AM), https://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/news/unc-investigation-athletes-pushed-into-fake-classes-by-counselors/ (reporting
that 3,100 student-athletes were involved in fake African-American Studies classes during an
eighteen-year scheme).
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portions of the year. Student-athletes would be given unique unit
requirements that allow them to maintain “full-time” student status, even
if enrolled in part-time or no units during season. Some of their practice
time could constitute units that fulfill general education requirements,
such as team building, leadership, experiential learning, etc. Further,
student-athletes would be offered a standard five-year plan (if
interested), giving them enough time to perform academically, while
staying committed to their sport. The five-year plan would not expand
their sport eligibility, but would give them an extra year to finish their
courses.
VI. CONCLUSION
The NCAA seems adamant about preserving the principle of
amateurism, but its methods of keeping the tradition alive have proven
inconsistent and exploitative. This Note proposes a three-part, studentcentered solution to reform the current state of affairs. First, the
Supreme Court should definitively hold that the principle of amateurism
is not a legitimate procompetitive purpose for the NCAA to pursue.
Second, the NCAA should stop adhering to the principle of
amateurism. Removing the principle of amateurism from the NCAA
rules does not mean that the NCAA will be unable to establish a clear
line of demarcation between college athletics and professional
athletics. The NCAA can establish this distinction by redefining the
term “student-athlete” to ensure that the education of studentathletes is taken seriously. The difference between an NCAA
student-athlete and a professional athlete, is that the student-athlete
is not only dedicated to athletic competition, but is simultaneously
focused on receiving a university education. Last, the NCAA should
work with the universities to improve the curriculum options offered
to student-athletes.

